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GUARANTEED CONFUSION:
THE UNCERTAIN VALIDITY
OF SURETYSHIP DEFENSE
WAIVERS IN CALIFORNIA
David E. Hackett*
If you want a guarantee, buy a toaster.
- Clint Eastwood'
I. INTRODUCTION
What happens when a borrower's credit is weak, negative, or
nonexistent? The lender's conventional response to such uncertainty
is to increase interest rates; 2 alternatively, the lender may swiftly
deny the loan application.' Another time-honored solution for
creative lenders and borrowers is the inclusion of a third party with
deep pockets or better credit to act as "guarantor" or "surety" in the
transaction.' The guarantor-perhaps motivated by familial or
.J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., June 2003,
University of California, Los Angeles. Thanks to Professor Dan Schechter for his helpful
comments and wealth of knowledge regarding California suretyship law.
1. THE ROOKIE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1990).
2. One truism of the market is the direct relationship between credit risks and interest rates.
See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1149 (1979) ("The price a creditor charges for extending credit-
the interest his debtor must pay for the privilege of borrowing-varies directly with the riskiness
of the loan itself.").
3. See Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented
Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1568 (1995) (noting
that banks "prefer to deny loans to borrowers they perceive as high-risk"); see also Brunner v.
N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("[O]rdinary commercial lenders ... may, after investigating their borrowers' financial status and
prospects, choose to deny as well as grant credit . . . according to their judgment as to the
likelihood of repayment.").
4. The California Civil Code considers the terms "surety" and "guarantor" to be
synonymous. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 2787 (West 2008) ("The distinction between sureties and
guarantors is hereby abolished.").
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commercial ties-promises to pay the lender any remaining loan
balance if the borrower ultimately defaults.
The suretyship contract frequently proves useful to
entrepreneurial borrowers as well.6 Lines of credit, construction
loans, or real property purchases are financed via the entrepreneur's
corporate entity.7  The entrepreneur, who is often a majority
shareholder in the corporation, will then personally guarantee the
corporation's debts, often "collateralizing" his guaranty by
hypothecating other real or personal property.8
California suretyship law explicitly grants legal rights and
defenses to sureties. These are generally encompassed by sections
2787 to 2855 of the California Civil Code ("Civil Code").9 But
while these provisions are theoretically available, lenders have
historically used their financial leverage to request (read: demand)
that the statutory defenses be waived.'" Virtually every guaranty
executed in California contains suretyship defense waivers."
Waivers are omnipresent because lenders are reluctant to fund
transactions where both primary and secondary obligors may escape
repayment liability, the former by insolvency and the latter by
operation of law. Consensually limiting the surety's rights and
defenses assures the lender of some recovery in the event of the
principal debtor's default.
5. See id. ("A surety or guarantor is one who promises to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another, or hypothecates property as security therefor.").
6. See Roy S. Geiger & Michael A. Allen, Fool With a Pen: The Use of Single Purpose
Entities in Real Estate Loans has Raised New Issues for Lenders and Guarantors Alike, L.A.
LAW., Jan. 2006, at 35, 38 (noting that a "large proportion of real estate loans today are made to
single purpose entities (SPEs)"). A major consideration in transactions involving entrepreneurial
borrowers is the so-called "sham guaranty." A sham guaranty might appear where the
entrepreneur has merged his distinct personal and corporate identities, neglecting the strictures of
corporate decision making and management. See Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr.
735 (1964). If the surety and principal debtor are actually alter egos, the surety may seek to claim
protection under California's debtor-protection statutes. See River Bank America v. Diller, 38
Cal. App. 4th 1400 (1995).
7. See Geiger & Allen, supra note 6, at 35.
8. The secured guaranty is a longstanding feature of California real property finance. See
Garretson Inv. Co. v. Arndt, 144 Cal. 64 (1904).
9. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2787-2856 (West 2008).
10. See Andrew A. Bassak, Comment, Secured Transactions Guarantors in California: Is It
Time to Reevaluate the Validity and Timing of Waivers of Rights?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
265, 280 (1992).
11. CAL. BANKERS ASS'N, SENATE FLOOR BILL ANALYSIS: A.B. 3101, at 3 (1994)
(analyzing A.B. 3101, S. 1993-1994, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994)).
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Because guaranties with defense waivers are widely used,
California lenders have made extensive efforts to ensure waiver
enforceability through legislative action.' 2 But historically, judicial
review of these waivers has not been lender-friendly, at times
operating to limit enforceability and restore statutory rights to
embattled sureties. 3 An atmosphere of uncertainty has traditionally
surrounded these provisions, and recent events have worked to
increase this confusion.
Part II of this Note examines the history of California suretyship
defense waivers since the mid-twentieth century and discusses the
historical uncertainty surrounding waiver validity. It also details the
California legislature's 1994 efforts to ensure lender-friendly
decisions in waiver contests. Part III argues that the legislature's
hopes for strong suretyship waivers have not come to fruition. A
recent decision by the California Court of Appeal, WRI Opportunity
Loans II, LLC v. Cooper,4 restores some of the "traditional"
uncertainty surrounding defense waivers. Part IV proposes draft
legislation to reaffirm the enforceability of these provisions and
ameliorate the confusion in this arena-at least in part.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Judicial Evaluation of Suretyship Defense Waivers Through 1994
The surety's obligation is not of recent vintage, though its
precise heredity is somewhat unclear. According to Oliver Wendell
Holmes's history of contract doctrines in The Common Law, the
suretyship contract has been enforceable at law since at least the
reign of King Edward III in the fourteenth century. 5 Holmes
remarks that "the surety of ancient law was the hostage" and that
"one of Charlemagne's additions to the Lex Salica speaks of a
12. See generally CAL. CIv. CODE § 2856 (West 2008). Unless otherwise indicated, all
textual references to "sections" are intended to indicate the equivalent portions of the California
Civil Code.
13. See infra notes 30-69 and accompanying text.
14. 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205 (Ct. App. 2007).
15. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 249 (Little, Brown and Co. 1923)
(1881), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/Books/Holmes/clawc.htm.
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freeman who has committed himself to the power of another by way
of surety."' 6
Historically, courts of equity developed numerous defenses for
sureties from whom payment was sought.17 California codified these
rights and defenses in 1872, basing them on the Field Code, which
was itself a product of the common law."8 Some of the key
suretyship rights and defenses included in the California Civil Code
are:
(1) Section 2809 (exonerating a surety if the surety's obligation
exceeds that of the principal debtor);' 9
(2) Section 2819 (exonerating a surety if the creditor alters the
principal debtor's obligation or the creditor impairs his own rights
against the principal debtor);2"
(3) Section 2845 (exonerating the surety if the creditor does not
pursue the principal debtor first, or impairs the surety's subrogation
rights);2' and,
(4) Section 2848 (affirming that the surety has the right of
"subrogation,"; allowing the surety to exercise every remedy against
the principal debtor that had been available to the creditor after the
surety satisfies the principal obligation).2
16. See id. To illustrate the historical ties between the taking of hostages and suretyship,
Holmes describes a medieval story involving Charlemagne:
In the old metrical romance of Huon of Bordeaux, Huon, having killed the son of
Charlemagne, is required by the Emperor to perform various seeming impossibilities as
the price of forgiveness. Huon starts upon the task, leaving twelve of his knights as
hostages. He returns successful, but at first the Emperor is made to believe that his
orders have been disobeyed. Thereupon Charlemagne cries out, "I summon hither the
pledges for Huon. I will hang them, and they shall have no ransom."
Id. at 248. As Holmes points out, to secure his performance of the "seeming impossibilities,"
Huon has "produc[ed] some of his friends as hostages." Id. Essentially, the hostages guaranteed
Huon's performance with their lives--quite a secondary obligation!
17. See Geiger & Allen, supra note 6, at 35.
18. See U.C.C. COMMITTEE, CAL. STATE BAR, 2002 CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY ON
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY 1 (2002), available at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/
sections/buslaw/ucc/2002-califo ria-commentary-on-restatement-of-the-law-third-suretyship-
and-guaranty.pdf.
19. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 2008).
20. Seeid. §2819.
21. See id. § 2845.
22. See id. § 2848.
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Another key defense appears in section 2810.23 Section 2810
generally operates to relieve the surety of the debt if the principal
debtor was not liable for performance at the time the principal
obligation was formed."
The California Supreme Court most notably cited section 2810
in an illegal-contract claim. In Wells v. Comstock,2 6 the court found
a certain primary obligation to be an illegal contract provision and
concluded that the principal debtor could never be held liable for
performance.27 Citing section 2810 as authority, the court then
relieved both principal debtor and surety of any obligation.28  The
language of section 2810 seems to justify the result in Wells,
providing that a surety is generally "not liable if . . . there is no
liability on the part of the principal" upon contract formation. 29
In addition to the statutory defenses, certain key defenses have
arisen from California case law. A defining decision in this regard
was Union Bank v. Gradsky. ° The Gradsky decision is notable both
for the "Gradsky defense" it formulated and for its analysis affirming
the validity of certain contractual waiver provisions.
In Gradsky, a lender furnished construction financing, taking
real property security from the principal debtor and a personal
guaranty from the project contractor, Max Gradsky.31 Gradsky's
guaranty documents contained only a very general waiver provision,
stating "I waive ...any right to require the holder of this within
instrument to proceed against [me] ...or to apply any security it
23. Seeid.§2810.
24. Section 2810 states in pertinent part:
A surety is liable, notwithstanding any mere personal disability of the principal ... but
he is not liable if for any other reason there is no liability upon the part of the principal
at the time of the execution of the contract, or the liability of the principal thereafter
ceases ....
Id.
25. Wells v. Comstock, 297 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1956).
26. Id.
27. See id. at 964 (noting that "the principal obligation of the contract is unenforceable
because of illegality").
28. See id. (citing, inter alia, section 2810 to conclude that "[s]ince the principal obligation
of the contract is unenforceable because of illegality, the guaranty too is unenforceable").
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2810 (West 2008).
30. 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968).
31. See id. at 66.
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may hold or to pursue any other remedy."32  After the principal
debtor defaulted, the lender sold the real property at a trustee's sale
and sought to collect the remaining loan balance from Gradsky.33
The Gradsky court began its decision by rewinding history and
untangling the transaction. Its first task was to determine the scope
of Gradsky's rights when the principal debtor initially defaulted.3 4 A
key determination in that regard was the scope of the waiver in
Gradsky's guaranty.35 With very little analysis, the court adopted a
relatively wide construction of the language. Although the waiver
made no reference to statutory defenses, it was held to effectively
waive both sections 2809 and 2845.36 The court stated:
Civ[il] Code §§ 2809 and 2845 . . . respectively, provide
that a surety's obligation must not be more burdensome
than that of the principal obligor, and a surety has the right
to require the creditor to exhaust his remedies against the
debtor and any security before he pursues the surety or
guarantor. [Gradsky] specifically waived the benefits of
those sections in his guarantee agreement in the Bank's
favor. That waiver effectively foreclosed him from
asserting those statutory rights ... ..
Thus, the court determined that at the time of the principal debtor's
default, the bank had an immediate remedy: demanding full payment
of the remaining loan balance from Gradsky.38 Thanks to Gradsky's
waiver of sections 2809 and 2845, he was powerless to require any
initial pursuit of the principal debtor and/or security.39
The court then considered the state of the parties' rights if the
bank had immediately pursued Gradsky and collected the full
remaining loan balance.4" If Gradsky had paid the bank, the court
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 68 (determining that "the rights [Gradsky] would have acquired from the Bank
had [he] paid [the principal]'s debt to the Bank before the Bank resorted to the security").
35. See id. at 67 n.3.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 67.
39. See id. (noting that the bank "could have sued [Gradsky] upon his guarantee for the full
amount of the unpaid balance... without proceeding against either [the principal debtor] or the
security").
40. See id. at 67-68.
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observed that he would have been subrogated to the bank's rights
against the principal debtor.4  As such, Gradsky would have
"acquired all of the rights which the Bank had against" the
principal.42 Because the bank held real-property security, the rights
acquired by Gradsky would have included the right to foreclose-
whether through a judicial action or under power of sale in the trust
deed.43
In addition to citing these considerations, the court set forth the
bank's alternative remedies at the time of the principal debtor's
default. The court noted that rather than collecting from Gradsky
immediately, the bank had two other available options. One
alternative for collection could have been a judicial foreclosure
action, joining both Gradsky and the principal debtor.44 Another
option would have been a trustee's sale.45
Next, in a key portion of the opinion, the court determined that
each of the bank's three collection alternatives would have different
effects on Gradsky's post-subrogation rights.46 If the bank proceeded
to immediately collect from Gradsky, he would have had robust
rights after subrogation.47 Gradsky also would have maintained post-
subrogation rights in the event that the bank judicially foreclosed,
joining Gradsky and the principal debtor.48 The judicial action would
have preserved Gradsky's rights by allowing him to file a cross-
claim for contribution against the principal debtor.49
The court determined, however, that the bank's third collection
option-a nonjudicial sale of the property-would irreparably
damage Gradsky's post-subrogation rights." Under section 580d of
the California Code of Civil Procedure,51 a creditor and his assigns
are forever barred from further debt collection efforts (also called a
41. Id. at 68.
42. Id.
43. See id. (stating that Gradsky "would have obtained by subrogation the right to pursue
either judicial or nonjudicial sale of the security").
44. Id. at 67.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 67-68.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 68.
51. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 2008).
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"deficiency judgment") after the creditor elects to satisfy an unpaid
debt through a nonjudicial sale of the real-property security.52 Thus,
through the operation of section 580d, the bank's nonjudicial sale of
the real-property security would fully destroy the future rights of any
creditor, including the subrogated Gradsky 3
In light of these considerations, the court ruled in Gradsky's
favor. 4 In sum, the court found that the bank had a selection of
potential remedies and that certain remedies would have preserved
Gradsky's rights.5 However, the bank selected the one remedy that
destroyed Gradsky's post-subrogation rights, a nonjudicial sale of its
security. Thus, "[u]pon the Bank's electing to pursue a remedy
which destroys both the security and the possibility of the surety's
reimbursement from the principal debtor, the creditor is thereafter
estopped from pursuing the guarantor. .".. ,5' The estoppel-based
"Gradsky defense" was born, and Gradsky was exonerated. 7
In the wake of Gradsky, lenders began to alter the waivers
included in guaranty documents, drafting them with the Gradsky
defense in mind. With valid Gradsky-defense waivers, lenders
aimed to ensure that choosing nonjudicial foreclosure would not
impact their ability to collect debt payment from a surety. Until the
lender-heartburn-inducing decision in Cathay Bank v. Lee,58 lenders
believed that their drafting was effective.
In Cathay Bank, a bank loaned $5.2 million to a corporate
debtor, securing the principal obligation with both real property and
a personal guaranty from one of the corporation's directors, Tom Y.
Lee. 9 In a series of events similar to Gradsky, the corporation
defaulted on its obligation. The lender then foreclosed, sold the real
property at a private sale, and obtained summary judgment against
Lee for the balance of the loan. 6°
52. Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 68-69.
53. See id. at 69 ("Because of section 580d neither the Bank nor the guarantor can recover a
personal judgment from the debtor after a nonjudicial sale of the security.").
54. Id.
55. See id. at 68-69.
56. Id. at 69.
57. Id. at 70.
58. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993).
59. See id. at 420.
60. See id.
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On appeal, Lee asserted the Gradsky defense.61 In response,
Cathay Bank presented the detailed and extensive suretyship waiver
provisions, which were seemingly designed in contemplation of the
Gradsky defense.62 The key provision of Lee's guaranty documents
stated:
Guarantor authorizes bank at its sole discretion . . . to:...
exercise any right or remedy it may have with respect to...
any collateral . . . [and] Guarantor shall be liable to Bank
for any deficiency resulting from the exercise by it of any
such remedy, even though any rights which Guarantor may
have against others might be... destroyed.63
The provision might appear to waive chapter and verse of
Gradsky.6 However, the appellate court stated that "it [was] not an
easy question" to determine whether the provision was an "explicit"
Gradsky waiver.65 The court read Gradsky to permit sureties a
"defense based on estoppel."66  Because the language in Lee's
guaranty referred only to Lee's "rights" and "[did] not provide the
reader with any actual awareness of the Gradsky defense" or section
580d of the California Code of Civil Procedure,67 the court construed
61. See id.
62. See id. at 42 1.
63. See id. at 421 n.4.
64. The language of Lee's waiver provision echoes passages of the Gradsky holding. The
Gradsky court explicitly disfavored "the Bank's... remedy which destroys both the security and
the possibility of the surety's reimbursement ...." Union Bank v. Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64, 69
(Ct. App. 1968) (emphasis added). Compare the Cathay Bank waiver, stating that "[g]uarantor
authorizes bank at its sole discretion. . . [to] exercise any right or remedy .... even though any
rights which Guarantor may have against others might be ... destroyed." Cathay Bank, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 421. (emphasis added).
65. Cathay Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422.
66. See id. at 423.
67. See id. at 425. Ironically, the Gradsky holding included an expansive reading of a bland,
brief suretyship defense waiver. However, Cathay Bank, a case centrally focused on Gradsky,
presupposed a narrow reading of an extensive, detailed waiver. See supra notes 29-30 and
accompanying text.
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the waiver in Lee's favor,68 relieving him of any obligation to the
bank.69
B. Legislative Intent Post-Cathay Bank:
The Addition of Section 2856
It is difficult to overstate lenders' concern regarding suretyship
defense waivers in the wake of Cathay Bank.7' From a lender's
perspective, the Gradsky decision can hardly be labeled a clear
resource for gauging waiver effectiveness. It was less than specific
about the nature of enforceable waiver language. While finding that
broad language was sufficient to waive certain statutory defenses, the
court also validated a new form of suretyship waiver based in the
operation of section 580d of the California Code of Civil
Procedure.71
After lenders responded by drafting waivers including the
Gradsky defense, the Cathay Bank decision compounded their
confusion. If the numerous, detailed provisions in Lee's guaranty
were insufficiently explicit to waive certain defenses, how might
courts construe the waivers in virtually every other California
guaranty? These concerns extended beyond the waivers examined
in the specific factual contexts of Gradsky and Cathay Bank, to
include worries about all forms of suretyship waivers.
Lenders noted that it would be impossible to draft reliable
suretyship documents with no clear guidance on future judicial
review and intervention.73 Even Cathay Bank's relatively careful
68. In another ironic twist, the Cathay Bank court found the challenged waiver provision to
be both excessively thorough and insufficiently specific. Initially, the court found that the waiver
did not specifically explain the Gradsky "defense." Cathay Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423
(emphasis in original). Yet the court also remarked that the waiver's details were "hard[] to
understand .... We dare say the average person would never figure it out." Id. at 425.
69. Rather than remanding the case for further findings about whether Lee's conduct might
have constituted a Gradsky waiver, the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's
judgment. See Cathay Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425.
70. See, e.g., CAL. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 11, at 4 ("[T]he ability of lenders was
shattered by the Cathay decision.").
71. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
72. See CAL. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 11, at 4 (observing that "commercial lenders
taking a security interest in California real estate are now essentially clueless regarding what
magical wording for a Gradsky waiver" would be enforceable at law).
73. See id. (noting that lenders were "clueless" regarding "what the next [waiver] decision is
likely to hold").
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drafting was ineffective to ensure waiver enforceability. 74  The
concern and criticism regarding Cathay Bank moved lenders and
legislators to take responsive action.75
In May 1994, the California State Assembly Committee on
Banking and Finance considered A.B. 3101, introduced by
Assemblyman Louis Caldera.76 The bill proposed an amendment to
the California Civil Code through the addition of section 2856."7
Under the then-proposed section 2856(a) (now enacted as law),
sureties would be expressly permitted to waive the Gradsky defense
and all common law rights and defenses (embodied in sections 2787
to 2855 of the California Civil Code). 78  They would also be
permitted to waive other additional rights based on subrogation and
contribution.79
Under the proposed section 2856(b) (also currently-enacted),
broad suretyship waivers of the rights and defenses in 2856(a) would
be considered presumptively valid. Indeed, the goal was to make
these waivers "effective whether or not [they] contain[ed] references
to specific statutory provisions or judicial decisions."8
As the bill passed through the California Assembly and Senate,
legislators were privy to key bill analyses explaining the effect and
intent of the measure.8 Certain key analyses pointed with alarm to
the Cathay Bank decision and discussed only the uncertainty
surrounding Gradsky waivers.82 However, their language also hints
at legislative aims to reinforce and strengthen the validity of all
suretyship defense waivers-whether the surety's defenses were
grounded in Gradsky, the California Civil Code, or elsewhere.
In the state senate, one bill analysis noted that "[i]n the absence
of legislative guidance, the use of a guaranty . . . is a very risky
proposition since the adequacy of any waiver language cannot be
reasonably predicted and may not be known until tested in
74. See id.
75. See id. at 2, 3 (citing Cathay Bank v. Lee as an explicit justification for the addition of
section 2856 to the California Civil Code).
76. See id. at 1.
77. 1994 Cal. Stat. 1422.
78. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856(a) (West 2008).
79. See id.
80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856(b) (West 2008).
81. See CAL. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 11.
82. See id.
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court. .". "" This remark points to the legislature's more general
concern with all types of suretyship waivers, beyond just the
Gradsky/Cathay Bank context. Combined with other portions of the
bill analyses, these remarks justify viewing section 2856 as a
remedial action to end uncertainty about the viability of all
suretyship defense waivers.
Another justification for viewing section 2856 as a sweeping
measure-altering California law as to all suretyship defense
waivers-appears in the same legislative analysis highlighted above.
The analysis considered the potential effects of the proposed section
2856(b), stating:
Under existing law, when a contract is interpreted, any
uncertainty will be interpreted against the party who has
written the contract.
Usually, guaranties are written by the lender .... This
bill would allow a waiver to stand even if it is not explicit
as to what defenses are being waived. Thus, contrary to
existing law, uncertainties will be decided in favor of the
lender who has drafted the contract.84
This passage indicates that section 2856(b) was a provision that
broke with the current state of the law, causing suretyship waivers to
be presumptively interpreted in the lender's favor. But more
importantly, the analysis also points out that the intent was to
strengthen all suretyship defense waiver provisions.85 Waivers
would be validated without regard to their specific language, their
citations to case law, or their reference to statutory provisions.86
Thus, a broadly worded suretyship defense waiver, which might
otherwise have triggered exacting scrutiny for proper phrasing and
explanations, would be validated under the new section 2856.
The legislative analyses of the proposed section 2856 outlined
an expansive vision for suretyship defense waivers. Although the
legislature's uncodified intent language indicated that the
amendment would not alter existing law, 7 the text of the bill
83. See id. at 5.
84. See id. at 6 (citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC v. Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 221 (Ct. App.
2007) (deferring to legislative statement that section 2856 was "declarative of existing law").
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analyses sends a different message. At the time the measure was
considered, the changes proposed were indeed "contrary to existing
law."88 They aimed to cement the validity of all suretyship defense
waivers--even where specific defenses were not referenced in the
transaction documents-and to limit the interpretation of waivers in
a lender-unfriendly manner.
III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
Following the addition of section 2856, the validity of suretyship
defense waivers was generally uncontested. Yet despite lenders'
seemingly strong position, a recent decision by the California Court
of Appeal, WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC v. Cooper,9 promises to
renew lender uncertainty in this arena.
In WRI, the court allowed a surety to assert an "illegality"
defense-heretofore believed to be derivative of rights in section
2810-in the face of a clear section 2810 waiver.9" The surety was
allowed to avoid liability under a theory barring "the enforcement of
illegal transactions."'" Therefore, the result calls into question the
validity of guaranties in transactions where the primary obligation is
(or could be) so invalidated.
Because section 2856 aimed to reduce uncertainty and generally
produce lender-friendly outcomes in waiver contests, the decision in
WRI is a clear departure from these goals.
A. Understanding WRI
The WRI dispute concerned a typical property development
transaction. Ronald and Ellen Cooper formed an entity, Cooper
Commons, LLC, for the purpose of developing sixty-two
condominiums.92  WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC ("WRI")
provided $2.5 million of Cooper Commons's project financing.93
WRI's loan to Cooper Commons was secured by both a junior lien
88. CAL. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 11, at 7.
89. 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205 (Ct. App. 2007).
90. Id. at219.
91. Id. at221.
92. Id. at 209.
93. Id.
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on the development property and individual personal guaranties from
the Coopers.94
Approximately two years after WRI's initial loan, Cooper
Commons agreed to significantly increased interest rates and a
complex additional sum based on the satisfaction of certain
contingencies.95 The Coopers again signed personal guaranties for
the amended Cooper Commons obligations.96  The personal
guaranties included provisions explicitly waiving the Coopers'
statutory suretyship defenses, including section 2810."7
By 2002, Cooper Commons had paid neither interest nor
principal to WRI.9" WRI turned to the Coopers, seeking payment on
their personal guaranties.99 When the Coopers failed to pay, WRI
filed suit for breach of the guaranties."' After WRI obtained a
summary judgment of approximately $6.6 million,1"' the Coopers
appealed.
At summary judgment and on appeal, the Coopers asserted a
usury defense, claiming that WRI had charged Cooper Commons
usurious interest on its primary obligation.0 2 WRI responded by: (1)
claiming that the Cooper Commons obligation was not, in fact,
usurious; and (2) arguing that the Coopers' usury defense was
encompassed by section 2810, a statutory defense the Coopers had
specifically waived.0 3
B. The Decision in WRI
The Second District Court of Appeal initially examined the
nature of WRI's loan to Cooper Commons and concluded that the
loan was usurious."' 4 But in the most interesting portion of the
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. The provision in question stated, "Guarantor affirms its intention to waive all
benefits that might otherwise be available to Guarantor or Borrower under . . . Civil Code
Sections 2809, 2810... among others." Id.
98. See id. at 210.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Brief of Appellants at 20-21, WRI, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205 (No. B191590).
103. See Brief of Respondent at 2, 32, WRI, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205 (No. B191590).
104. See WRI, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 218.
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opinion, the court examined the interaction between the Coopers'
usury defense and section 2810.
In this second portion of WRI, the court stated that at the time
section 2856 was added, "existing law" permitted sureties an
illegality defense based on a common law "rule against . . . illegal
transactions" that was not grounded in the California Civil Code.'05
Because the legislature did not intend to alter "existing law" when it
enacted section 2856,06 the illegality defense survived to the
Coopers' arsenal in WR. 1  The court reasoned that because the
illegality defense existed independently from section 2810, WRI's
section 2810 waiver arguments were inapposite.
To identify the "existing law" at the time the legislature was
debating section 2856, the court cited a sentence of the Wells v.
Comstock decision, finding that the Coopers' usury defense was
based on a "public policy" rule "against the enforcement of illegal
transactions." '  In Wells, the Supreme Court did exonerate a
guarantor by holding that "[s]ince the primary obligation was illegal
and unenforceable, the guaranty too is unenforceable."' 09 However,
the Supreme Court cited both section 2810 and section 117 of the
First Restatement of Security as authority."0
The WR! court seized upon the Wells string citation to section
117."' The court located a passage in comment d to section 117 that,
they claimed, provided an "independent" rationale for allowing
guarantors to assert illegality defenses and, by extension, usury
defenses.12 The portion of comment d so identified stated that
"[w]here the principal's promise is itself illegal in its inception, and
the performance of the surety's contract is subject to the laws of the
same jurisdiction ... it is against public policy to give legal effect to
the surety's obligation.""'3
105. Id. at 221 (citing Wells v. Comstock, 297 P.2d 961, 964 (Cal. 1956)).
106. Id.
107. See id. ("[T]he Coopers' waiver of their defenses ...was ineffective regarding their
usury defense.").
108. Id. at 220-21.
109. Wells, 297 P.2d at 964.
110. See id. In addition to citing the authorities discussed, the Wells court also cited Jack v.
Sinsheimer, 58 P. 130 (Cal. 1899).
111. WRI, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 220.
112. Id. at221.
113. See id. at 220 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURITY § 117 cmt. d (1942)).
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This mere comment to the Restatement of Security, dignified by
the WRI court as a "rule against the enforcement of illegal
transactions," apparently served as the linchpin of the court's
analysis."l 4 With comment d to section 117 of the Restatement as
their major premise, the court reasoned that the Coopers did not
waive their usury defense." 5
C. Re-Evaluating Section 2856:
Was the Statute "Declarative of Existing Law"?
The first and most distinct area of concern in the WRI decision is
the court's approach to analyzing section 2856. After determining
that pre-1994 California law permitted sureties a usury defense based
on common law, the court examined the effects of section 2856-an
amendment enacted to clarify suretyship defense waivers.116
Concluding that the addition of section 2856 did not displace the
Coopers' usury defense, the court relied on the legislature's
statement that section 2856 was merely "declarative of existing law"
at the time." 7
Such reliance was unwarranted. As the California Supreme
Court remarked, "[a] legislative declaration of an existing statute's
meaning is neither binding nor conclusive."1 When interpreting an
ordinance prefaced with language declaring existing law, the
California Court of Appeal remarked that "[t]his statement is the
beginning, but not the end, of our analysis.""' 9
As the legislative history of section 2856 indicates, there is
reason to doubt the legislature's statement that section 2856 was
merely declarative of existing law. The legislative analyses
examining the proposed bill specifically expressed concern about
reinterpretation of all types of waiver provisions. 20 Additionally, the
language of section 2856(b) contravened prior California court
decisions regarding waivers by trying to ensure lender-friendly
114. Id.
115. See id. at 221-222 (noting that WRI "failed to establish a valid waiver of the Coopers'
usury defense").
116. Id. at 221.
117. Id.
118. W. Sec. Bank v. Superior Court, 933 P.2d 507, 514 (Cal. 1997).
119. Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 157, 161 (Ct. App. 2002).
120. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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results in waiver contests.'21 The legislative analyses identified
section 2856 as a measure intended to move beyond simply restating
suretyship law.
If the WRI court had examined the records predating the
enactment of section 2856, it may have reached a different
conclusion about the statute's intended effects, rather than simply
deferring to legislative pronouncements. If anything, it appears that
section 2856 was enacted with the goal of enhancing lenders'
abilities to enforce suretyship defense waivers, preventing sureties
from avoiding their contractual commitments.1
2
D. Evaluating WRI
In addition to general concerns about the court's interpretation
of section 2856, the WRI decision also raises concerns for its
particular approach to statutory construction. To reach its result, the
court was necessarily forced to construe section 2810.
The pertinent language of section 2810 reads: "A surety is
liable, notwithstanding any mere personal disability of the principal.
. but he is not liable if for any other reason there is no liability upon
the part of the principal at the time of the execution of the
contract.' 2'  A literal reading of this language yields only one
interpretation: section 2810 relieves a surety of liability whenever the
principal debtor is not liable for performance at the time of
contracting, except in cases of personal disability.
But the WRI court did not adopt a literal reading, instead
construing section 2810 narrowly. In their view, section 2810 did
not operate to relieve a surety's liability in every case where the
principal debtor was not liable for performance. An exception to
section 281 O's operation was carved out for illegal transactions.124 In
the subset of cases where the principal transaction was illegal, the
court stated that sureties could maintain a defense based outside of
section 2810, protecting themselves with the common law "rule
against enforcing illegal transactions. '"125
121. See id.
122. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2810 (West 1993).
124. WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC v. Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 221 (Ct. App. 2007).
125. Id.
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Thus, section 2810's operation was constrained, and it was
considered inapplicable in certain situations. Even though the
principal debtor in WRI was not liable for performance because of
the illegality of the underlying loan agreement, an illegality defense
was not "available" to the Coopers as sureties "by reason of' section
28 10.126
While the WRI court's efforts to narrowly construe section 2810
were necessary to its holding, they were also an unwarranted
weakening of the statute. Mandatory case authority in California is
unmistakable: "[w]hen statutory language is . . . clear and
unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not
indulge in it.'
27
The language in section 2810 is crystal clear: if the principal
debtor is not liable "for any ... reason" besides personal disability,
the surety is exonerated at common law.128  The phrase "for any
reason" is very broad. By using this phrase, the statute distinguishes
between two scenarios that may face the guarantor. In cases of the
principal debtor's personal disability, the guarantor will not be
exonerated. But in any other case where the principal debtor is
exonerated (including illegality), the surety will also be exonerated.
Furthermore, prior suretyship law also supports the view that section
2810 encompasses illegality defenses.'29
By clear statutory language, the guarantor should be exonerated
if the underlying obligation in a transaction is unenforceable due to
any form of illegality, including usury. The illegality defense is thus
properly subsumed within section 2810, and section 2810 occupies
the entire field of exoneration in California. With such clear
language as "for any ... reason," there is no room for an alternate
reading of the statute and no precedent to support one. 130
126. Id.
127. People v. Lance W. (In re Lance W.), 694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985) (citing Solberg v.
Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1977)); see also Cal. Sch. Employee Ass'n v. Governing
Bd., 878 P.2d 1321, 1327 (Cal. 1994) (noting that when "the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous... [courts] follow the plain meaning").
128. CAL CIV. CODE § 2810 (West 2008).
129. See Barbara B. Rintala, California's Anti-Deficiency Legislation and Suretyship Law:
The Transversion of Protective Statutory Schemes, 17 UCLA L. REv. 245, 293 (1969) ("[O]ne
defense [was] expressly made applicable to the guarantor by Section 2810 of the Civil Code-
illegality of the principal obligation .... ").
130. CAL CIV. CODE § 2810 (West 2008).
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Beyond its construction of section 2810, a fallback concern
about the WRI decision remains. There are ample reasons to doubt
the WRI court's finding that section 2856 did not alter pre-1994
California suretyship law. Even if section 2856 were intended only
to preserve pre-1994 law, that "existing law" permitted waiver of all
statutory defenses, including section 2810.' Under either
conception of section 2856-whether it is read as a waiver-
strengthening measure or as an effort to restate existing law-
waivers of section 2810 should be properly enforceable.
In one notable pre-1994 case, Engelman v. Bookasta,'32 a surety
argued that waivers of the rights in section 2845 of the California
Civil Code should be prohibited on grounds of public policy. The
court disagreed, stating that "[r]ights of sureties under sections 2845
and 2849 have existed ever since they were created in 1872 and the
Legislature has not included such rights with others that cannot be
waived."'33 Thus, under Engelman, section 2810 waivers (along with
waivers of all other common-law suretyship rights) would appear to
be permissible, even under pre-1994 "existing" California law.
While Engelman is perhaps the most strongly worded authority
on point, the 1957 California Supreme Court decision in Bloom v.
Bender'34 also generally supports enforcement of suretyship defense
waivers.'35 In Bloom, a principal debtor was released from his
obligation by a creditors' committee.'36 The surety sought to avoid
liability on her contingent obligation by asserting rights under
section 2809 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the
"obligation of a surety must be ... reducible in proportion to the
principal obligation."'37  After finding that the guarantor's initial
contract included a section 2809 waiver, the court remarked,
"carrying out the expressed intent of the parties [to a surety
agreement] accords with the basic rules of suretyship law." '38
131. See infra note 135.
132. 71 Cal. Rptr. 120 (Ct. App. 1968).
133. See id. at 122 (emphasis added).
134. 313 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1957).
135. For a summary of decisions, including California Supreme Court authority, supporting
the enforcement of suretyship defense waivers, see Bassak, supra note 10, at 280 n.87.
136. Bloom, 313 P.2d at 570.
137. CAL CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 2008).
138. Bloom, 313 P.2dat 573.
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E. Public Policy: In WRI and Beyond
A central theme of WRI is its public policy preference favoring
sureties and principal debtors against creditors.' But there are
equally compelling policy arguments to support suretyship waivers
of the usury defense and all other surety defenses.
First and foremost, it is useful to consider California's relatively
weak public policy against usury. California law against usury is
riddled with loopholes and exceptions. Even as early as 1964, it was
observed that:
California does not have such a strong public policy against
any and all contracts which would be usurious .... [T]he
constitutional prohibition of usury . .. exempts from its
provisions banks, building and loan associations, industrial
loan companies ... and several other kinds of lenders, and
gives the Legislature the right to prescribe maximum limits
for the exempted lenders. A strong public policy, based on
a settled concept of justice or morality would not be meshed
with such alterable rates as the legislature might choose to
impose. 1
40
Yet even presuming that the usury law inures to some slight
public benefit, this benefit could easily be maintained without
damaging sureties' freedom of contract. If anything, usury law is
aimed at protecting "unwary and necessitous borrowers"' 14 1 from "the
money lender, who would prey upon misfortune and wring [funds]
from the needy .... ,,W But these considerations should not operate
to protect sureties.
Whether or not they are considered in the usury context, sureties
are not victims or unsophisticated parties whose judgment the law
may doubt. They are instead "professional suretyship compan[ies]
receiving a fee for providing ... credit support or ... principal[s] of
a development entity [supporting] the entity's project.' 1 43  The
139. See WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC v. Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 221 (Ct. App.
2007) ("[Tihe usury defense rests on the rule against the enforcement of illegal transactions,
which is founded on considerations of public policy ...independent of sections 2809 and
2810.").
140. Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 38 Cal.Rptr. 376, 382 (Ct. App. 1964).
141. Del Marv. Caspe, 272 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Ct. App. 1990).
142. In re Washer, 248 P. 1068 (Cal. 1926); see also Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at
39 n.33.
143. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 39.
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legislature is perfectly willing to treat sureties with respect, allowing
them greater freedom of contract. Section 2856 allows sureties to
waive various legal protections, including the "one action rule"'" and
the "fair value rule."'45 But section 2953 prohibits similar waivers by
the principal debtor.'46
Practical experience and legislation demonstrate that sureties are
responsible entities who deserve considerable freedom of contract,
not judicial paternalism.'47 A public policy favoring usury-defense
waivers-indeed, favoring waivers of all statutory defenses-already
exists.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
To avert damage to California suretyship law from the WRI
decision, it is important to learn from history. After the lender
uncertainty created by Cathay Bank, the California Legislature
moved to amend the Civil Code, clearly indicating a preference for
waiver enforceability.'48 By enacting section 2856 in 1995 (and the
"safe harbor" waiver language introduced in 1996), the legislature
apparently wished to disfavor the result in Cathay Bank and prevent
court invalidation of suretyship waivers.'
As recent scholarship notes, section 2856 is highly lender
friendly and pushes California courts in the direction of waiver
enforcement.' 0 Therefore, effectively invalidating the WRI court's
holding and ensuring the continued validity of suretyship defense
waivers would seem possible via the same strategy of Civil Code
amendment.
To that end, interested parties may wish to consult the following
sample amendment to section 2856. This proposed language could
144. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856(a)(3) (West 1996) (referencing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726
(West 1976)).
145. See id. (referencing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West 1976)).
146. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2953 (West 2008).
147. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (1976)
("Judicial paternalism is to loss shifting what garlic is to a stew-sometimes necessary to give
full flavor to statutory law, always distinctly noticeable in its result, overwhelmingly
counterproductive if excessive, and never an end in itself.").
148. See supra note 77.
149. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
150. For an excellent discussion of the lender-friendly effects of section 2856, see Geiger &
Allen, supra note 6, at 37 ("Section 2856 contains user-friendly safe-harbor language that the
courts can construe only one way-in favor of a waiver.").
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be added as part (c) of section 2856, with parts (c) to (f) re-lettered
accordingly:
(c) Without limiting any rights of the creditor or any
guarantor or other surety to use any other language to
express an intent to waive the guarantor or other surety's
rights and defenses to liability described in Section 2810
(including, without limitation, the defense of illegality of
the principal's obligation), the following provisions in a
contract shall effectively waive such rights and defenses:
The guarantor waives all rights and defenses that the
guarantor or other surety may have because the
debtor's obligation is illegal. This means, among other
things, that:
(1) The creditor may collect from the guarantor or
other surety notwithstanding any usurious
provision(s) in the contract between the debtor and
the creditor;
(2) If the creditor forecloses on any real property
collateral pledged by the debtor:
(A) The amount of the debt may be reduced
only by the price for which that collateral is
sold at the foreclosure sale, even if the
collateral is worth more than the sale price.
(B) The creditor may collect from the
guarantor or other surety even if the creditor,
by foreclosing on the real property collateral,
has destroyed any right the guarantor may
have to collect from the debtor.
(3) This is an unconditional and irrevocable waiver
of the debtor's rights and defenses to liability
which may also be available to the guarantor or
surety through the operation of Section 2810
(including, without limitation, the defense of
illegality of the debtor's obligation).
By enacting the above proposed legislation, the legislature can
reemphasize its support for enforcing suretyship defense waivers and
lender-friendly interpretations. Using "safe-harbor" language is
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particularly well suited to this task because it offers an objective
means for determining waiver existence. If the clear statutory
language appears in a guaranty contract, a valid waiver of section
2810 is presumed. As a result, waiver-related litigation wiould be
reduced because guarantor challenges are less likely in the face of
unassailable, objective evidence of a waiver's existence.'51
Market actors, including creditors and other interested parties,
would have incentives to disseminate new "form guaranties"
containing the language because they rely on waiver enforceability. 52
Thus, in the vast majority of guaranty transactions, the prospect of
waiver uncertainty could be effectively eliminated, whether counsel
is present or absent. The current safe-harbor language was rapidly
incorporated into suretyship contracts after 1996,153 and there are no
additional barriers to form redistribution today.
V. CONCLUSION
Guaranty contracts are a fundamentally important tool in many
loan transactions, and they are particularly useful in the commercial
setting. For entrepreneurs and commercial lenders, personal
guaranties are frequently paired with loans to corporate entities,
creating an attractive means for extending entrepreneurial credit.'54
Faced with judicial challenges to guaranty enforceability in the mid-
1990s, the legislature sensibly worked to safeguard their viability,
and section 2856 was a step forward in the process.'55
Yet since the WRI ruling, unpredictable judicial examination of
suretyship defense waivers has again become a concern, and the
legislature should act quickly once again. By adding additional safe-
harbor language to the California Civil Code, the legislature could
significantly reduce judicial review of defense waivers. If the
151. Scholarship indicates that objective legal tests are less litigant friendly as compared with
subjective tests. See Dan S. Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior Unrecorded
Transferees of Real Property: Rethinking the Goals of the Recording System and Their
Consequences, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 105, 166 (1988). Objective rules are highly praised in 2
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.2 (1999) ("Unless there is
an overwhelming policy argument... it is always wise to ... make decision turn on some easily
determinable objective event ... ").
152. See Bassak, supra note 10, at 280.
153. See Geiger & Allen, supra note 6.
154. Id. at 38.
155. Id. at 37.
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legislature fails to act, uncertainty will continue to surround
California's widespread, highly useful surety contracts.
